The present symposium is a reaction to one of the most stimulating debates that the Chinese philosophical community has seen in years. The vigorous challenges mounted by LIU Qingping prompted a wide-ranging and constructive conversation that has focused in four areas: first, the historical, contextual interpretation of classical Confucian teachings, and their strengths and weaknesses in that context; second, arguments about the continuing cultural influence of these Confucian orientations; third, methodological questions about the proper way to study and develop Chinese philosophy; fourth, more substantive argument about what sort of philosophy one ought to adopt today. As both an important and insightful participant in the debates and the chief force behind organizing and presenting these discussions to a wider public, GUO Qiyong also deserves tremendous credit. Finally, I would like to offer my thanks to HUANG Yong for enabling philosophers outside of China to continue the conversations initiated by Professors LIU and GUO.
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In this short essay I will take issue with what I believe is Professor LIU's most central contention, namely that "consanguineous affection" is the "supreme principle" [Liu 2007 , 5] of Confucianism. Another way he puts this is to say that Confucianism "places filial piety absolutely above everything else" [Ibid] . I agree, that is, with Professor GUO's contention that for neither classical nor neo-Confucians were statements about the importance of filial piety "credited as general principles, [and thus] we can see that they do not endorse blood affection as something supreme" [Guo 2007, 24] . My approach will be to consider three ways in which one might reach a decision on what to do in the face of an apparent conflict between values. One possibility is to strive to maximize some underlying ur-value, to which all other values may ultimately be reduced. A second option allows for irreducibly distinct values, but calls for choosing the greater value over the lesser, according to a fixed, ordinal ranking. The third method I consider grants that some values may generally be more significant than others, but advocates the situation-specific harmonization of all values in a manner that honors the importance of each distinct value. LIU's position requires either the first or (more likely) the second of these options, but I argue that Confucians both do and should endorse the third.
There is an emphasis in both classic Confucian passages and later neo-Confucian discussions on viewing a situation imaginatively so as to avoid an either/or choice. In a recent book, Mark Csikszentmihalyi provides important background to this idea. He cites some early examples of individuals faced with dilemmas who do not find good solutions; early commentaries on these stories invoke the phrase "both advancing and retreating are problematic" [Csikszentmihalyi 2004, 4] . However, a theme of Csikszentmihalyi's book is the emergence of the idea of perfect sages who can synthesize or harmonize the various relevant virtues. His focus is on the physical-cum-psychological "material virtue" underlying this and other developments.
For present purposes, let us consider the following passage, cited by Professor LIU as "Case 2" [Liu 2007, 2] "A humane man never harbors anger or nurses a grudge against a brother. All he does is to love him. Because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank; because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy wealth. To enfeoff him in Youbi was to let him enjoy wealth and rank. If as Emperor he were to allow his brother to be a nobody, could that be described as loving him?" "May I ask what you meant by saying that some called this banishment?" "Xiang was not allowed to take any action in his fief. The Emperor appointed officials to administer the fief and to collect tributes and taxes. For this reason it was described as banishment. Xiang was certainly not permitted to ill-use the people." [Mencius 5A:3; Mencius 1970, 140-1, slightly modified] Here we have a situation that looks rife with conflict. The passage suggests that at least three values are involved: love for one's brother, a more general compassion for the people of Youbi, and just or equitable treatment for criminals.
Shun's solution is certainly not to add up the importance of each of these on a single scale and act accordingly: there is no hint of an underlying value (like Mohist "benefit," for instance) that can tell us how much attention to pay to the well-being of the people, on the one hand, and to what degree Shun should feel (or at least express) love for Xiang. It also does not appear that Shun simply chooses one "supreme" value over the others. His solution is complex, leading some to call it "banishment" rather than "enfeoffment." I would therefore argue that Shun has seen a harmonious solution -one that will honor all the relevant aspects of this particular situation. In saying this, we should recognize the way in which Shun has dealt with Wan Zhang's complaint about the injustice of the solution. Shun clearly does not recognize the applicability here of a "treat like cases alike" principle, because the cases are not alike: we have different relationships to our close kin than we have to others.
2 In other words, a prima facie conflict has been imaginatively resolved without any cause for regret and without the perceived forgoing of any genuine value.
Zhu Xi says that this solution was "the extreme of humaneness (ren zhi zhi 仁之至) and the utmost appropriateness (yi zhi jin 义之尽)" [Zhu 1997 [Zhu , 1213 . This idea can be clarified if we recall the culinary and musical metaphors with which the concept of harmony was first developed(See [Guo 2000 ], [Li 2006] , and Chapter Four of [Angle, forthcoming] ). It is certainly true that a cook needs to take into account the amounts of pepper, broth, and so on in his soup as he decides how much salt to add. His goal, though, is an appropriate saltiness -the perfect contribution to the overall harmony -rather than maximizing the amount of salt he can put into the soup without compromising the other ingredients. Once he finds the harmony, we are not tempted to say that some saltiness was sacrificed in order to preserve the right amount of pepper.
Western philosophers like Martha Nussbaum are concerned that in conflictual situations we will be forced to forgo genuine values, and it is clear that Professor LIU is similarly worried by the results of Confucian attention to filial love. I think it should be clear, to begin with, that genuine values are not forgone in the case of soup, and this is not because there is one, underlying value (perhaps "taste") to which all other values are reduced. It is perfectly cogent to think about salt and pepper as distinct, incommensurable values, and to aim at a balance or harmony between them, rather than choosing one (supreme) value over the other. Similarly,
Zhu's analysis of Shun's treatment of Xiang is that no values are forgone. Humaneness is not traded off against appropriateness; instead, each is perfectly (or maximally) expressed, relative to the possibilities afforded by the situation. Zhu Xi and his fellow neo-Confucians would of course characterize the "possibilities afforded by the situation" in terms of "coherence (li)." 4 So, when discussing the statement in Analects 13:18 that "fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers" when one has done something wrong, Zhu says that this is "the extreme (zhi 至) of universal coherence and human feelings" [Zhu 1987, 98] . Varying specifications of context always provide the framework within which one can talk about "perfect" or "extreme"
(or, suitably qualified, "maximal") expression of values. Indeed, Yu Kam Por has argued that even when only one value is mentioned, determination of whether one goes too far, falls short, or is perfectly apt in one's expression of the value is always implicitly relative to (at least) one other value [Yu forthcoming, 61] .
Instead of mounting a text-based argument against seeing filial piety as a supreme value -on which see Professor GUO's essay -my aim has been to articulate a philosophical position that better accounts for the complexity of ethical decision-making, as it is described in the passages from Mencius on which Professor LIU has based his argument. In response to a view somewhat like mine, Professor LIU objects that what Shun did "already harmed the interests of the people of Youbi" [Liu 2007, 10] , and thus cannot be seen as seamlessly uniting the demands of filial piety with humaneness. This complaint is unconvincing because it relies on the idea that unless every effort is single-mindedly devoted to maximizing their interests, the people will be "harmed." But this can only make sense on one of the first two models of ethical decision- tradition, open to revision and development, rather than as a static museum-piece. Instead of Professor LIU's "post-Confucianism," therefore, I suggest we take seriously the possibility of a contemporary Confucianism that learns and grows through dialogues like that between Professors LIU and GUO.
